A recent federal audit of the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration’s original certification of the Boeing 737 Max raises fundamental questions about the wisdom of airline self-regulation first started in 2005.
The Boeing aircraft was involved in two fatal crashes in 2018 and 2019 killing 346 passengers and crew aboard Lion Air Flight 610 and Ethiopian Airlines Flight 302. The plane was grounded afterwards, but the FAA rescinded that grounding order in November 2020 following Boeing’s update to its flight control software known as MCAS, among other changes.
Several airlines are now flying updated 737 Max planes, which had been grounded for 20 months. United Airlines recently ordered 25 new Boeing 737 Max aircraft in a sign of confidence.
Nonetheless, the federal audit focuses heavily on a longstanding policy of the FAA called Organization Designation Authorization (ODA). ODA is used by the FAA to grant companies such as Boeing the authority to conduct functions including safety checks that the companies would normally have sought from the FAA itself.
In Boeing’s case with the 737 Max, the audit found that “the Boeing ODA process and structure do not ensure ODA personnel are adequately independent” of Boeing itself.
“While the agency has taken steps to develop a risk-based oversight model and address concerns of undue pressure at the Boeing ODA, it is not clear that the FAA’s current oversight structure and processes can effectively identify future high-risk safety concerns at the FDA,” auditors at Office of Inspector General for U.S. Department of Transportation added in a 59-page report.
The audit made 14 recommendations, all concurred with by FAA, although 13 of the recommendations won’t see FAA action for years, until as early as the last day of 2022 and as late as the last day of 2025. The FAA will take action on one recommendation on March 31.
The FAA said it is developing guidance on “undue pressure and communications” in the ODA program.
One portion of the audit said the “FAA has not implemented a robust, risk-based approach for ODA oversight” noting that the engineers at Boeing eventually were delegated 87% of certification of the aircraft by 2016, including flight controls and stabilizer plans that included MCAS.
The audit adds, “FAA’s certification guidance does not adequately address integrating new technologies into existing aircraft models…FAA did not have a complete understanding of Boeing’s safety assessment performed on MCAS until after the first accident.”
George Leopold wrote in EE Times that the FAA’s failure to ground the new aircraft after the first crash in October 2018 “is among the greatest failures in the history of commercial aviation.”
Calling the ODA “odious,” Leopold said the program first developed out of an “unrelenting push for airline deregulation, undue pressure by Boeing that ultimately led to certification of a new faulty airframe configuration and lack of FAA resources.”
The day after the audit was released on Feb. 23, Boeing issued a short statement saying it is implementing an enterprise Safety Management System, but it did not mention ODA specifically:
“We appreciate the Inspector General’s review of the 737 MAX design and certification, as well as the recommendations to strengthen and improve the regulatory process. Boeing cooperated fully and extensively with the Inspector General’s review.
“Boeing is dedicated to the values of safety, quality, and integrity in all that we do. We have undertaken significant changes to reinforce our safety practices, and we have already made progress on several of the recommendations outlined in the final report, including implementation of an enterprise Safety Management System.
“As part of our ongoing efforts, we have made meaningful improvements across our company, including organizational changes, enhanced compliance policies and training initiatives, and the creation of new mechanisms to further ensure transparent safety and quality reporting. These actions are already driving measurable results, and we are committed to making continued improvement every day.”
On Feb. 26, the FAA assessed $ 5.4 million in deferred civil penalties against Boeing for failing to meet its performance obligations under a 2015 settlement. Also, Boeing agreed to pay $1.2 million to settle two pending FAA enforcement cases.
The $5.4 million was assessed because Boeing missed improvement targets and because some Boeing managers did not sufficiently prioritize compliance with FAA regulations, the FAA said.
“I have reiterated to Boeing’s leadership time and again that the company must prioritize safety and regulatory compliance and that the FAA will always put safety first in all its decisions,” said FAA Administrator Steve Dickson.
One of the two cases in the $1.21 million settlement alleged that Boeing implemented an improper structure of its FAA-approved ODA program and exerted undue pressure or interfered with ODA unit members. The other case alleged Boeing failed to follow its quality control processes and subjected ODA members to undue pressure or interference related to an aircraft airworthiness inspection.
The FAA committed it will be “vigilant” in its oversight of Boeing engineering and production activities. Referring to oversight provisions in the 2020 Aircraft Certification, Safety and Accountability Act, the FAA said it allows the FAA to assess even greater civil penalties against manufacturers that exert undue pressure on ODA unit members.
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